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TRIAL AND ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE. 
By Eleanor P. Wolf. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1981. 
Pp. 373. $19.95. 
Although school desegregation cases following Brown v. Board of 
Education 1 originally required only racially neutral pupil assign-
ment, more recent cases demand the elimination of "all vestiges of 
state imposed segregation."2 In Trial and Error, Professor Eleanor 
Wolf attacks the assumptions that underlie these stricter remedial 
requirements. Wolf thoroughly examines the Detroit school deseg-
regation case3 and concludes that the evidence presented was mis-
leading, incomplete, and prejudicial to the Detroit School Board. 
Had the evidence accurately reflected the available social science re-
search, she asserts, the Detroit school system would not have been 
found guilty of unconstitutional behavior. 
Wolf takes the "scientific" testimony of the expert witnesses in 
the Detroit case as her starting point. Juxtaposing their testimony 
with her own analysis of the social science research, she methodi-
cally (1) demonstrates that Judge Roth received the misleading im-
pression that residential segregation4 resulted from state-imposed 
housing discrimination; (2) undermines the seductive proposition 
that integration of the schools would eliminate impediments to black 
children's achievement without harming white children and would 
generally improve race relations; and (3) shows that it is impossible 
to prove that the Detroit School Board's actions caused or contrib-
uted to persistent segregation in the City's schools.5 
l. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. l, 15 (1971). 
3. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Judge Stephen Roth's finding 
of segregative constitutional violations by the Detroit School Board led to his ill-fated busing 
order involving 53 suburban school districts. The Supreme Court limited the remedy to De-
troit since the suburban school districts had not been found guilty of constitutional violations. 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974). 
4. Judge Roth relied, in part, on a finding of state-imposed residential segregation in issu-
ing his widespread busing order. 338 F. Supp. at 587. The Sixth Circuit approved the busing 
remedy, but expressly rejected residential segregation as a basis for its affirmance. Bradley v. 
Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973). 
5. The term "segregation" is used here to mean racial concentration, whether caused natu-
rally or by governmental action. 
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Wolfs solid sociological treatment of these issues contrasts 
sharply with her speculative conclusions. Apparently relying on 
Judge Roth's strong interest in the testimony (p. 126), she claims that 
the "proofs of the harm of segregation and the benefits of integration 
were crucial in motivating the judge to 'find' that Detroit School 
Board actions caused racially segregated schools, despite the murky 
and illogical nature of the evidence" (p. 245). Although Wolf con-
cedes that she "cannot prove the point," she compounds her error by 
suggesting that such evidence has also dictated the result "in some 
other cases" (p. 245). 
Although Wolfs hypothesis is intuitively attractive, there are 
strong indications that her conclusion may be wrong. She reports, for 
example, that Roth rejected evidence tending to refute the benefits of 
integration on the ground that Brown had already decided that issue 
(p. 226). His opinion, consistent with these rulings, did not mention 
the supposed educational benefits of integration. Roth, moreover, 
evidently was aware of the law. He expressed disappointment that 
blame had to be fixed (p. 20), but proceeded to do so. There is no 
documentary support for Wolfs assertion that the judge's "inclusion 
of school violations was a reluctant concession to the requirements of 
legal precedent" (p. 160). 
Wolfs eagerness to explain Judge Roth's ruling in terms of his 
reaction to the questionable social science evidence may stem from 
her disbelief that the Detroit School Board, lauded for its integration 
efforts, had caused school segregation. Her characterization of the 
requirement that segregation be caused by school authorities as a 
"legal fiction" is apt,6 but does not complete her argument. Al-
though it does not appear that the actions cited by the court as con-
stitutional violations contributed substantially to school segregation, 
it also does not appear that Roth ignored the requirement of a causal 
connection between the School Board's actions and segregation. 
Roth's ruling, like other Northern cases that have followed it,7 may 
be viewed as the logical consequence of prior Southern cases. Roth 
may have been influenced by evidence that integration was benefi-
cial, but it is equally plausible that he correctly understood the 
6. Wolf is not alone in observing that the causation requirement is illusory. See generally 
Dayton School Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 442 U.S. 526 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Columbus School Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colorado, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
7. The early Southern cases implied causation between past de Jure discrimination and 
later school segregation even though de Jure segregation had been replaced by racially neutral 
assignment schemes. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 
(1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). More recently, .Dayton and 
Columbus validated district-wide busing remedies for violations similar to those cited by Roth 
as having segregative effects in the Detroit schools. 
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Brown mandate as requiring only a limited causal connection be-
tween school board actions and segregation. 
Wolfs frustration with the attenuated causal nexus between past 
discrimination and present school segregation thus seems more a 
quarrel with substantive law than with the social science research 
presented in Milliken. Because plaintiffs may rely on the Keyes pre-
sumption to infer district-wide segregative intent from proof of seg-
regative intent in a meaningful portion of the school district, and on 
the Green/Swann presumption that past discriminatory acts have 
caused current segregation, it is difficult for school authorities to re-
but a prima facie case of unconstitutional segregation. Although 
Wolf ably refutes the logical conclusion drawn from these presump-
tions, they provide an alternative, legitimate basis for Roth's ruling. 
Because the law provided a basis for Roth's decision, Wolfs con-
clusion that trial courts are unable to receive and evaluate mislead-
ing social science evidence is not persuasive. But she does 
successfully attack many of the assumptions underlying busing, and 
the book is thus a partial success. Trial and Error offers ample proof 
that our current solution to a critical social problem is grossly inade-
quate. It may be, as Wolf observes, that social policy that attains 
constitutional stature "does not readily reflect new knowledge and 
more accurate appraisals of its consequences; it is the essence of such 
rights that they must not depend on such cost-benefit calculations" 
(p. 296). Whether or not busing is wholly unbeneficial, the right to 
be bused has become constitutionally enshrined in certain circum-
stances. Unfortunately, Wolfs assertion that reliable presentation of 
social science research results might allow judges to formulate more 
effective policies is unsubstantiated. 
